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“When two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.”- Acholi Proverb
“Charity sees the need, not the cause.”- German Proverb
I.

Abstract
This project explores the impact of American governmental and non-

governmental actors on the Lord's Resistance Army conflict in northern Uganda and
southern Sudan, particularly the U.S. military, United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The
efficacy of these various forms of intervention, specifically the presence of U.S. Special
Forces tracking the LRA, and various soldier reintegration, governance, and
sustainability programs initiated by USAID and NGOs, such as Invisible Children, is also
examined. Additionally, this project seeks to uncover underlying geopolitical objectives,
such as gaining alliances in the 'Global War on Terror' and protecting regional oil
interests, which have motivated the U.S. government to pursue these policies. Overall,
this project has sought to critically examine the impact of American involvement in the
northern Uganda conflict, both positive and negative, and evaluate the human cost of
these international geopolitical influences on the people of northern Uganda, southern
Sudan, and beyond.
II.

Research Topic
In 1986 Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) began a guerrilla

war in northern Uganda against the administration of President Yoweri Museveni that
would last 20 years and devastate the Acholi region. However, the violence that
originated in Acholiland, northern Uganda shifted for many years to southern Sudan, now
an independent nation. This trans-national conflict compounded existing regional
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tensions between the Sudanese and Ugandan governments, instigated a brutal proxy war
between Presidents Museveni and al-Bashir, and has since progressed to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic, leaving civilian casualties in its
wake.
The impact of American humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
especially Invisible Children, has significantly influenced northern Ugandan
infrastructure and Acholi culture. Meanwhile, the political and economic influence of the
US government originating in their post-September 11th, 2001 ‘War on Terror’ campaign
has noticeably affected Uganda’s efforts against the LRA and the Acholi region as whole.
Not only has it directly contributed to regional power struggles and trans-national
political tensions between Uganda and Sudan, but President Museveni’s support for the
Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in a proxy war with Sudanese President
Bashir exacerbated the conflict with the LRA. Museveni’s endorsement of the SPLA,
despite its role in the increase of regional tensions has been consistently supported by
Western nations, particularly the United States, due to Sudan’s categorization as a state
sponsor of terror by the American government.
US military advisers were sent to Uganda in the late stages of the 20 year war
with the LRA due to increasing pressure from non-governmental organizations and the
Ugandan government, an ally in the ‘War on Terror’. They continue to assist Ugandan
defense forces in the demobilization and reintegration efforts of remaining LRA
personnel. However, US direct support for President Museveni has been widely criticized
by both Ugandans and Western groups who argue that Museveni’s clear regional biases
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and reluctance to negotiate during peace talks are as responsible as LRA violence for
prolonging the conflict and contributing to existing regional instability.
The United States government is also responsible for the funding of extensive
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) missions in Uganda
including humanitarian assistance and peace building projects. Critics, however, accuse
USAID of blatantly promoting US interests in the region through political influence,
economic dependency, and product monopoly. On the other hand, supporters, including
Ugandans, believe that international groups such as USAID and Great Britain’s
Department for International Development are more effective in addressing northern
Uganda’s economic and humanitarian problems than local initiatives because of their
experience, strong infrastructure, and reliable funding.
In contrast, NGOs, which are predominantly funded and administrated by
Western governments and private donors, are effective even when national interests are
not at stake. In many ways, their absent political allegiance assists them in aiding victims
of the conflict and mediating between warring groups, though their capacity to stop
ongoing violence is limited. Though uninhibited by clear international allegiances, NGOs
also face criticism for promoting their own nations’ interests and for interfering in local
affairs without a complete understanding of fundamental social, political, and economic
issues. Furthermore, NGOs tend to lack the ability and authority to affect political
change, are reliant on funding from international donors, and are often only able to
provide immediate relief rather than long-term political or economic solutions.
The purpose of this project is to examine and compare the various forms and
efficacy of American involvement in the cross-border conflict between the SPLA, the
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LRA, Ugandan, and Sudanese forces instigated by Kony’s rebel movement. Specific
topics include government sponsored and non-governmental American intervention, and
the long-term impact these interventions have had on Acholiland and the region of eastcentral Africa as a whole.
III.

Methodology
Primary sources include data from the official sites of the US State Department,

the CIA World Factbook, and the Fund for Peace Failed States Index, as well as firsthand research done in Gulu District, Uganda. Secondary sources range from news articles
to academic publications related to aid in Africa, US Foreign Policy in East Africa, and
analyses of the Ugandan government, LRA conflict, and civil war in the Congo and
South Sudan.
IV.

Literature Review
Existing literature regarding US relations with the Ugandan government includes

analyses and official statements regarding both economic and foreign policies. The US
Department of State acknowledges structural challenges in the Ugandan government
including “…corruption, underdeveloped democratic institutions, and human rights
deficits,” but insists Uganda is both an active member of the America’s preferential trade
program and a “key” regional security ally due to their efforts against Sudan, a nation on
the State-Sponsored Terrorism list, and Somalia, a safe haven for terrorist groups. 1
Robert Anthony Waters’ independent analysis, also published in 2009, traces US
support of President Museveni to the 1990s when anti-AIDS programs and development
efforts attracted American support and promises of aid, which, when combined with aid

1

United States Department of State. "US Relations with Uganda."; Country Reports on Terrorism 2009.
Washington: US Department of State, 2010., 193, 30
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from other international donors eventually amounted to 40% of the national budget. 2
Jeffrey Herbst in his analysis of US Economic Policy in Africa also identifies financial
aid based on “commitment to reform” as an important underlying factor in US-Uganda
relations since the 1990s. 3 However, Waters acknowledges cuts in American-provided
aid due to Uganda’s support of Rwandan transgressions against the Congo, corruption
and illicit trading allegations against the Museveni administration including human rights
abuses and undemocratic adjustments to the constitution that allowed the President to run
for an illegal third term. In his critique of Museveni’s dictatorial ‘presidency,’ Joshua B.
Rubongoya suggests that the continuing aid to Uganda allowed his undemocratic
practices to continue unchecked despite the aforementioned transgressions. 4
In a more resource-oriented analysis of US-Uganda relations, Kofi Nsia-Pepra
suggests that the recent militarization of US-Africa relations reflects American strategic
interests in preventing the spread of terrorism and securing natural resources such as oil,
gold, copper, and uranium. 5 Nsia-Pepra is not the first to suggest American self-interest
in limiting Sudanese and Somali terrorist group activity as a motivation for supporting
Museveni or, as Waters suggests, overlooking the Museveni administration’s human
rights abuses in favor of allying with him in the ‘War on Terror’. 6 Nsia-Pepra does,
however, take the rare step of implying that access to material resources is another
underlying motive for US-Uganda relations, citing covert military activity in 2007 in a

2

Waters, Robert Anthony. Historical Dictionary of United States-Africa Relations. Lanham, Md.:
Scarecrow Press, 2009., 300
3
Herbst, Jeffrey Ira. U.S. Economic Policy Toward Africa. New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press,
1992., 13, 36
4
Ibid., 300, 188; Rubongoya, Joshua B. Regime Hegemony in Museveni's Uganda. Basingstoke : Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007.
5
Nsia-Pepra, Kofi. "Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa: Strategic Gain Or Backlash?" Military
Review 94.1 (2014): 50-9., 55, 57
6
Waters, 188

Norris

6

gold and oil rich region of the Congo, presence in Darfur, home to the fourth largest
copper and third largest uranium stores in the world, and alliances with states such as
Uganda that are hostile to Sudan, China’s fourth largest supplier of oil. 7
Literature related specifically to northern Uganda and the LRA conflict is less
widespread, but as a result, the existing publications have all been written and edited by
regional experts with extensive field experience in Acholiland, lending credibility to their
arguments. A compilation of essays edited by Tim Allen, a developmental anthropologist
and Uganda expert, and Koen Vlassenroot, a political scientist, a series of opinions
regarding the political and economic dynamics of the conflict. These essays are presented
by, among others, Adam Branch, Andrew Mwemba, and Sverker Finnström. 8
Branch, a political scientist with a focus on human rights and Western
intervention in northern Uganda, writes that the confluence of Acholi marginalization in
national politics, social crises exacerbated by the conflict, and the weakening of existing
local structures by international donors and aid groups have prolonged the socioeconomic
and political issues of Acholiland, preventing the development of a strong local
government. As such, the lack of support from the Ugandan government and the loss of
control to government-supported international aid groups have weakened the local
authorities of Acholiland without ameliorating their ongoing struggles. 9 Similarly,
Sverker Finnström, an anthropologist who has done extensive fieldwork in Acholiland,
argues that the underlying sources of the conflict, regional tensions, northern
marginalization, and colonial legacy at the root of Kony’s rebellion are inadequately
7

Nsia-Pepra, 54
Allen, Tim, and Koen Vlassenroot. The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. London : Zed, 2010.
9
Branch, Adam. "Exploring the Roots of LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland."
The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. Eds. Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot. London : Zed, 2010.
25-44.
8
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addressed in analysis of the conflict and in international and national political
discourses. 10
Andrew Mwenda, a renowned Ugandan journalist, similarly criticizes the federal
government and its role in the LRA conflict in Acholiland, though not in response to the
national marginalization of Acholi political leaders. He argues instead that President
Museveni and his party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), have taken
advantage of political and economic opportunities presented by the conflict, reducing
their incentive to support conflict resolution strategies. Specifically, he cites steady
international funding granted as a reward for economic liberalization, as relief in the
ongoing conflict, and in support of an ally against Sudan and Somalia as an inducement
for the government to side-track negotiations and long-term recovery efforts. 11
Other perspectives on the conflict between the Ugandan national government and
the LRA are provided by Lawrence Cline, a counter-terrorism, civil-military relations,
and LRA expert, and Matthew Green, a journalist with wide-spread experience in Africa.
The basis of Cline’s work is to explore the political and socio-economic factors and
international security consequences of the LRA rebellion, while Green’s memoir is a
travel narrative describing his search for Joseph Kony and the on-the-ground impact of
the conflict. Both express a similar view of the LRA and its representation in
international discourse, arguing that the focus and exaggeration of Kony’s image and the
atrocities of the LRA distract from the underlying political grievances of the rebellion

10

Finnström, Sverker. "An African Hell of Colonial Imagination?: The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda,
another Story." The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. Eds. Tim Allen and Koen
Vlassenroot.London : Zed, 2010. 74-89.
11
Mwenda, Andrew M. "Uganda's Politics of Foreign Aid and Violent Conflict: The Political Uses of the
LRA Rebellion." The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. Eds. Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot.
London : Zed, 2010. 45-58.
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and provide an excuse for Western donors to ignore the culpability of the Ugandan
government in the prolongation of violence. 12
In a similar argument criticizing both Western-Uganda political relations and
international aid in the North, Adam Branch writes in his quintessential critique of aid in
the LRA conflict, Displacing Human Rights, that Museveni’s alliance with the US and its
supporters in the ‘War on Terror’ has allowed Museveni to commit various human rights
abuses and exploit the rules of the International Monetary Fund restructuring program by
increasing military spending and conducting illegal operations into neighboring countries.
Despite Uganda’s heavy economic reliance on foreign aid, the national government led
by Museveni and the NRM has repeatedly violated the sovereignty of neighboring
countries, particularly the Congo and Sudan, committed acts of political oppression, and
broken various national election laws to maintain his leadership position without
consequence. 13 However, as Allen and Vlassenroot observe, the recent discovery of oil,
Uganda’s strategic location and political alliance in the international ‘War on Terror,’ and
history of cooperation with its Western allies protects Museveni from economic
abandonment and international prosecution. 14
While international aid faces widespread criticism from a multitude of sources,
the most commonly cited problems, particularly in scholarship regarding foreign aid in
Africa, are the unintended consequences and harmful side effects of aid, the debilitating
corruption that undermines it, and concerns that Western intervention in developing
African nations is akin to modern-day imperialism or white paternalism. Firstly, multiple

12

Cline, Lawrence E. The Lord's Resistance Army. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2013.; Green,
Matthew. "The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa's Most Wanted." New York: Olive Branch, 2008.
13
Branch, "Exploring the Roots of LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in Acholiland."
14
Allen, Vlassenroot
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scholars of foreign aid such as Jonathan Glennie and several African critics, attest that
economic and developmental aid is often responsible for increased poverty in their areas
of operation. 15 Both Glennie and Cristopher Coyne see indirect effects as a fundamental
criticism of aid, identifying unintended consequences such as the focus on macro
infrastructure projects regardless of local community impacts, the potential creation of a
power vacuum when aid serves to empower a political leader responsible for the poverty
and displacement in the first place, and the threat of unequal allocation of resources as an
incentive for combat. 16 Finally, according to Glennie and Robert Calderisi, the
prevalence of aid groups and donors in every aspect of aid distribution from funding, to
political support, to implementation of projects without the involvement of local
governments or work forces, prevents the recipient countries from developing their own
national or local infrastructures to generate resources or solutions, which instills
dependency among the beneficiaries. 17
In Calderisi’s critique of international aid in Africa, his focus rests heavily on the
culpability of the recipient countries themselves. He cites poor governance, specifically
the prevalence of “thugs” in positions of national leadership, recurring regional violence,
and consistently weak infrastructure among the obstacles facing developing countries that
prevent the effective use of aid and national resources. 18 This criticism is supplemented
by other scholars including Glennie, Coyne, and Addison, who further stipulate that

15

Glennie, Jonathan. The Trouble with Aid: Why Less Could Mean More for Africa. London; New York:
Zed Books in association with International African Institute, Royal African Society, Social Science
Research Council; New York: distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
16
Ibid.; Coyne, Christopher J. Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2013.
17
Coyne; Calderisi, Robert. The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006.
18
Calderisi, 57
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conflict recovery initiatives are more effective when locally or nationally led, assuming
the necessary infrastructure and government processes are bolstered. 19
Further concerns about aid distribution in a country suffering from a debilitated
economic infrastructure or poor governance is the fear that funding and public projects do
not adequately address the underlying political and economic issues that create poverty
and instability. Coyne in particular is critical of the efficacy of development aid based in
contributing inputs to a corrupt, unregulated, and weak economic system without first
addressing structural concerns. 20 He further stipulates that foreign aid groups are ill
equipped to address issues of national governance or economic systems. Addison’s
argument supports Coyne’s critique, suggesting that post-conflict recovery and
development efforts are only effective when supported by internal infrastructure
bolstering political and economic reforms, though she does not undermine the role that
international funding can play in impoverished states. 21
Another prominent criticism of foreign aid, particularly that donated by Western
powers to developing African nations, is the accusation that procurement of funding and
resources is simply a tool to influence policy and economic decisions, akin to modern day
imperialism. In his analysis, Glennie accuses foreign donors of imposing political
ideologies or reforms as a condition for aid on countries that lack the infrastructure to
institute them.22 Similarly, Shastry Njeru suggests that Western targets of international
terrorism have, since the September 11th attacks, used aid as leverage over developing

19

Glennie; Coyne; Addison, Tony. From Conflict to Recovery in Africa. Oxford; New York : Oxford
University Press, 2003.
20
Coyne
21
Addison
22
Glennie
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countries in order to secure their support in the War on Terror. 23 Coyne’s critique
supports this view, claiming that donor countries choose projects and beneficiaries based
on the relative political or economic benefit rather than objective measurements of
humanitarian or economic need. 24
The final and perhaps most controversial argument against international aid
donations is the accusation that international initiatives in developing countries is
paternalistic and elitist on the part of donor countries and volunteers. Though referring to
Latin America rather than Africa, Ivan Illich’s famous appeal to young humanitarian
volunteers encourages the abandonment of the sense of superiority that compels them to
travel to developing countries to assist people ‘in need’. He argues instead that these
countries provide opportunities for tourism, enculturation, and education, not an
opportunity to satisfy a white savior complex. 25 Larry Krotz asserts a similar view in his
analysis of aid administered in Africa by Westerners. He questions the morality of
intervening in foreign countries and imposing ethnocentric conceptions of ‘progress.’ He
further criticizes the underlying attitude of the researchers, scientists, students, and
missionaries who travel to developing African nations, claiming it reduces the exposed
population to research test subjects with no valid opinions or religious beliefs of their
own. 26
These evaluations of the moral and practical shortcomings of international
development and recovery aid work in tandem with Addison’s argument that internal

23

Njera, Shastry. "Post-9/11 Aid, Security Agenda and the African State." Aid to Africa: Redeemer Or
Coloniser? Eds. Hakima Abbas and Yves Niyiragira.Chicago : Pambazuka Press, 2009. 93.
24
Coyne
25
Illich, Ivan. "To Hell with Good Intentions." 1968.
26
Krotz, Larry. The Uncertain Business of Doing Good: Outsiders in Africa. East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 2009.
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reform and development efforts must be the initiative of local and national groups rather
than misguided outsiders. Leon van Soest’s suggestion follows a similar vein. In his
documentary exposing the destructive consequences of large-scale aid projects in Kenya,
he demonstrates that uninformed intervention can create as much poverty as it resolves. 27
V.

Background to the Conflict
The marginalization of the Acholi that underlies the LRA conflict can be traced to

Uganda’s first coup d’état. Following independence, Milton Obote, Uganda’s first prime
minister from the northern region of Lango attempted to bridge ethnic political
differences through tribally diverse government. However, Idi Amin, who felt that the
prime minister’s own Langi tribe and their northern Acholi allies were politically and
economically favored, overthrew the government in 1971. 28 He proceeded to fill his
cabinet and military with followers from his own region, the West Nile, while ordering
the Langi and Acholi soldiers of Obote’s administration to be killed en masse, deepening
the North-South divide. 29 With support from the Tanzanian government, Obote regained
power through violence in 1979, and ordered forceful reprisals in several communities in
Amin’s home region. However, widespread poverty as a result of Amin’s despotism, the
Tanzanian invasion, and IMF austerity measures effectively prevented economic
favoritism from recurring among Northerners. 30 Following rigged elections in 1980,
Yoweri Museveni, a southerner, led his National Resistance Army (NRA) against Obote,
seizing power in 1986. 31 Unfortunately for the northerners, the emerging government led

27

Addison; Good Fortune. Dir. van Soest, Leon. Transient Pictures, 2009.
Branch, Adam. Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda. Oxford University
Press, 2011., 56; Green, 73
29
Ibid.; Cline 7
30
Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 58
31
Waters, 299; Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 59
28

Norris 13
by the NRM, “saw the Acholi as its ethnic enemy” and proceeded to restructure the
country’s government without including northern Acholi leaders, and even perpetrated
violence against Acholi civilians. 32
A rebel group known as the Ugandan People’s Democratic Army briefly gained
the support of the Acholi population but never gained enough ground to mount a
rebellion. 33 Soon thereafter, the Holy Spirit Movement led by an Acholi woman, Alice
Lakwena, attempted to retake Kampala and end regional violence. She was killed,
however, and the movement failed within a year of its founding in 1987. Joseph Kony,
also an Acholi claiming to be a cousin of Lakwena, continued the rebellion with his
Lord’s Resistance Army. 34 Unlike Alice Lakwena, however, Kony resorted to violence
against his own people, including looting, child abductions, and dismemberment to
ensure loyalty of the Acholi population. The Ugandan government, led by Museveni, left
Acholiland undefended. 35
Eventually, President Museveni, a former schoolmate of Sudanese rebel John
Garang, pledged the support of his national defense force to the Sudan People’s
Liberation Army independence movement, prompting Sudanese President al-Bashir to
supply and harbor the LRA in retaliation, prolonging the conflict for an additional 12
years. 36 After the failure of the 1994 peace talks, focus shifted from the Uganda-LRA
dynamics to the role of the Sudanese government, which had already begun financially
supporting the LRA. 37 By 1994, the US government had also begun funding the SPLA
32

Ibid., 61, 65
Ibid.
34
Ibid., 70
35
Ibid.
36
LeRiche, Matthew, and Matthew Arnold. South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2012.
37
Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 74-75
33
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through Kampala as part of its opposition to the spread of Islamic extremism and Osama
bin Laden’s influence in Sudan, though Uganda itself only has a 12% minority population
of Muslims. 38
VI.

Invisible Children and American NGOs
International NGOs have distinct advantages and disadvantages in comparison to

governmental and multi-national groups in conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery,
especially their political impartiality. Lacking affiliation with a specific national agenda,
NGOs are able to focus on humanitarian issues without interference from geopolitical
posturing or competition for resources. In Uganda, non-governmental groups were
integral in assisting with food distribution in camps for internally displaced persons
(IDPs), efforts to ameliorate corruption and improve governance, reintegrate former
child-soldiers and sex slaves, and implement livelihood and recovery projects.
Furthermore, they coordinated their projects and peacemaking initiatives with traditional
cultural and religious leaders to improve their efficacy. 39 In response to the violence,
foreign aid groups, to their credit, initiated a “humanitarian scramble” in the affected
areas of Uganda. As a result NGOs became primary “stakeholders” in initiating
negotiations, addressing human rights violations, and supporting national recovery
efforts, and have acted as a “catalyst” for the improvement of administrative networks
between the Ugandan government, international aid groups, and actors within the
conflict. 40

38

Ibid.
Allen, Tim. Trial Justice : The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army. London;
New York: Zed; London: In Association with International African Institute; Claremont, South Africa:
David Philip; New York: Distributed in the USA exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2006., 137
40
Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 196
39
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Conversely, NGOs in Uganda face sufficient criticism for undermining local
recovery efforts and infrastructures, addressing the windfall of the conflict rather than its
underlying causes, allegations of corruption, and contributing to the humanitarian crises
caused by crowding civilians into IDP camps during the height of the violence. Despite
the extensive efforts of multi-national, international, and non-governmental groups,
Green observed in his tour of Uganda during the nation-wide hunt for Kony that “nobody
was tackling the war’s underlying causes.” 41 In a similar critique, Branch concludes that
the underlying issue with foreign aid is that, “given that the massive financial aid inflow
into an area with minimal agricultural production, no industry, and total displacement led
to the development of an economy almost entirely determined by foreign funding” rather
than local initiatives or infrastructures. 42 Locally, NGOs in northern Uganda are also
resented due to the perception that they are “corrupt and partial,” and as a result of the
obvious disparities between foreign aid workers and unemployed residents. 43
The best known and perhaps the most influential of the American NGOs
addressing the LRA conflict is Invisible Children, founded in 2006 and nationally
recognized for the release of their video Kony 2012 in March of 2012. As a result of the
attention garnered from one of the most viral online videos in history, Invisible Children
impacted American public opinion overnight and earned significant political influence
that enabled them to pressure the US Congress into passing a LRA Disarmament Bill. 44
However, despite their relative success in influencing both public opinion and actual
legislation, Invisible Children and its video campaign have been criticized for

41

Green, 86
Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 143
43
Ibid., 145
44
Cline, 133; Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 238
42
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encouraging the depiction of Africans as helpless, and promoting action without first
understanding political and cultural complexities or policy implications.
Critics of the Kony 2012 video believe it promotes the ‘White Savior complex,’
encouraging privileged white Americans to bring change to Africa, despite lacking
knowledge of the political, cultural, and social complexities of the violence. Specifically,
they find the video campaign “self-aggrandizing, sensationalist,” and argue that it serves
only as “activism for privileged young Americans that is unlikely to lead to sustainable
social change in Africa…” 45 Furthermore, they believe that both the video and the
organization, “[sponsor] a narrative in which Africa remains an object to be manipulated
by outsiders instead of a dynamic context with talented and knowledgeable actors,
compelling ideas, and potential resources,” “invokes the ideology of the innocent child
victim in need of white Americans for… redemption,” and presents Uganda as an
“obscure, distant locale” rather than an autonomous, sovereign nation. 46 In other words,
the fear that the stereotypical presentation of Uganda, and Africa in general, will
encourage inefficient and ethnocentric intervention by young, privileged Americans more
focused on “[feeling] good than they are with contributing to social change in Africa.”
These faults, Amy Finnegan argues, have undermined the efficacy of Invisible Children’s
projects. 47
The danger of blindly supporting aid efforts, they argue, is that the lack of
understanding regarding the nuanced history of Uganda and US involvement reinforces
militarization and “blinds young Americans to thoughtful analysis of the genuine needs
45

Edmondson, Laura. "Uganda is Too Sexy: Reflections on Kony 2012." TDR: The Drama Review.3
(2012): 10., 11; Finnegan, Amy C. "Beneath Kony 2012: Americans Aligning with Arms and Aiding
Others." Africa Today 59.3 (2013): 137-62., 138.
46
Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 237; Finnegan, 138 151
47
Ibid., 159
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on the ground, the already ongoing indigenous efforts to address those needs, and the
potential impact of outsiders’ efforts.” 48 As with any foreign NGO, certain shortcomings
can significantly undermine progress achieved by those organizations. Faults include
overlooking the negative impact that their projects have on local initiatives and the
affected civilian populace, the tendency toward cultural imperialism, and a failure to
address the underlying issues in favor of treating the symptoms of the conflict for the
purpose of feeling accomplished and benevolent.
VII.

US Government Intervention
Before September 2001, US-Uganda relations were relatively unremarkable. 49

The US maintained an antagonistic relationship with Idi Amin due to his “anti-Western
rhetoric” and the government-mandated expulsion of East Asians from the country. 50
Following the installation of Milton Obote in 1979 and his subsequent overthrow by
Yoweri Museveni in 1986, the US government became one of many international donors
who provided nearly half of Uganda’s national budget. They contributed to the new
government’s social and economic reforms as a provision of the 1988 program that
provided monetary assistance to countries demonstrating reform, including structural
readjustment programs mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 51 Aid flow
from industrialized countries and international groups continued due to Museveni’s
success in “[restoring] stability, human rights, and economic prosperity…” to the nation,
and as a reward for his compliance with structural reform and anti-AIDS efforts. 52

48

Ibid., 139, 155; Branch, Displacing Human Rights, 237
Allen; Central Intelligence Agency. "The CIA World Factbook Uganda." The CIA World Factbook.Web.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html>.
50
Waters, 299
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Ibid., 299-300; Herbst, 13
52
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International political dynamics shifted following the end of the Cold War in 1990
from anti-communism to anti-Islamic extremism. The antagonistic relationship between
Museveni and Sudanese President al-Bashir earned US support for Uganda, as Osama bin
Laden had identified Sudan as the “center of his expansive global ambitions…” for
Islamic fundamentalism. 53 Suddenly, Uganda’s strategic location, political sympathies,
and dependency on international aid made it a desirable and attainable regional ally.
Bordering both Kenya and Tanzania, the sites of the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam US
Embassy bombings of 1998, which were organized by a Bin Laden’s Sudanese based alQaeda network with governmental compliance, Uganda proved to be a geographically
strategic location with politically useful affiliations. 54
Uganda’s political value was further bolstered by the terrorist attacks on the
United States in 2001, after which the American government pursued a strong anti-terror
foreign policy. Not only was Sudan added to the list of States Sponsoring Terror, but its
affiliate, the LRA, was identified by the US as a terrorist organization. 55 Furthermore,
counterinsurgencies and infrastructure support operations became an important political
and military strategy to prevent the cultivation of extremism in developing nations.
Located on the border of the Congo and South Sudan, and in the region of Sudan and
Somalia, the four most failed states in the world as of 2013, Uganda is a uniquely situated
ally in America’s initiative to promote

53

US Council on Foreign Relations. More than Humanitarianism: A Strategic U.S. Approach Toward
Africa. Lake, Anthony; Todd Whitman, Christine; Lyman, Princeton N.; Morrison, J. Stephen ed. 56 Vol.
New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 2006., 56
54
Ibid., 57, 56; Waters, 281
55
Ibid., 270; Allen 51; Cline, 132

Norris 19
[e]conomic growth, improvements in education and health, and more
accountable government… to mobilize Africa’s deep and abiding religious
and cultural traditions in resisting the siren song of extremism. 56
To reward Uganda’s support in the international ‘War on Terror,’ both for undermining
the government in Khartoum through SPLA endorsement and for contributing troops to
the Somalian operations against al Qaeda affiliate al-Shabab, the US has consistently
provided the Museveni administration with financial and military support. 57
However, American foreign aid policies, both military and developmental, face
significant criticism. The federal government is accused of the diversion of aid money,
largely influenced by the Department of Defense, towards military, law enforcement, and
political support for governments and military actors friendly to US interests rather than
towards poverty alleviation, healthcare and education reforms, infrastructure
strengthening, and governance improvement. 58 Accusations of US military, political, and
economic imperialism via aid programs have unfortunately become a “trademark of US
international relations…” since the September 11 attacks. 59 In 2000, for example, Israel
and Egypt, key military and political allies of the US in the Middle East and North
Africa, received twice as much aid money as all of sub-Saharan Africa combined though
it is the location of the highest concentration of impoverished countries in the world. 60
Even food assistance programs, part of counter-insurgency and infrastructure
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strengthening policies, are often more reflective of American domestic agriculture
surpluses than humanitarian objectives. 61
In Uganda specifically, economic aid has been directed not only towards
humanitarian aid and infrastructure stabilization but military logistical support. In fact,
following Museveni’s alliance with the US against Khartoum and the 2007 operations
against al-Shabab in Somalia, Uganda rose to become one of America’s top ten recipients
of foreign aid, receiving $457 million in 2010.62 According to Cline, between 2002 and
2011 $50 million of US peacekeeping funds were directed towards logistical support of
the Ugandan military under the condition that they cooperate with neighboring
governments and refrain from committing atrocities, though Uganda’s key strategic
importance has allowed numerous human rights abuses and violations of other nations’
sovereignty to go unpunished. 63
Economic support has been primarily distributed through the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), which has “provided emergency
assistance with food and shelter” during the conflict, and “assisted war-affected children
and unemployed youth with tools and access to training to gain better access to income
generating activities” as part of the conflict recovery effort. 64 Total monetary
contributions from the State Department amount to $560 million in conflict-related
humanitarian assistance between 2002 and 2011, $750 million for post-conflict recovery
efforts, and an additional $10 million dollars per year between 2011 and 2013 as a
provision of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery
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Act of 2009, passed by the US Congress. 65 In congruence with other international
donations, aid comprises nearly half of Uganda’s national budget. This figure was
exceeded it in 2008, 2 years after the conclusion of the war, when foreign assistance
encompassed 64% of the budget. 66
The results of USAID’s programs and American economic policies overall are
commendable. Genuine progress has been made in the field of education reform with the
help of international donors’ debt forgiveness initiatives, which have allowed the
Ugandan government to provide free primary schooling for four children in every
family. 67 Waiving fees and cumulative debt has also allowed great advances in health
care, including anti-AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis programs, due to significant
increases in health clinic attendance and a doubled rate of immunizations. 68 USAID also
claims to have made progress in long-term sustainability and agriculture programs that
have assisted both the conflict recovery efforts and long-term poverty alleviation. 69
Furthermore, as an institution it has been commended for its efforts to initiate
negotiations between the LRA and the government of Uganda, though they ultimately
failed. 70
Despite their success, USAID has also been criticized for imposing ideological
beliefs on their recipients, impeding programs with extensive bureaucracy, and
complicity with instigating a humanitarian crisis. Specifically, USAID’s approach to
AIDS prevention has been panned due to the “wrong headed nature” of the conditions
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attached to AIDS programs, specifically ideological concerns about abstinence and
prostitution.71 Further critiques include the accusation of slowing or altogether halting
ongoing programs through extensive bureaucracy that affect not only USAID programs,
but independent initiatives that are organized or overseen by larger organizations
including USAID, the IMF, and World Bank. 72
However, the greatest accusation facing all international aid groups in the
northern Uganda conflict, including USAID and cooperating NGOs, is the internment of
thousands of people in protected camps that resulted in the creation rather than the
alleviation of a major humanitarian crisis. Under the guise of protecting civilians from
LRA attacks, the Ugandan government mandated the concentration of the population of
the Acholi region in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), resulting in the
widespread dependence of at least a million people on food aid from NGOs and
government aid programs, coordinated by the UN’s World Food Program (WFP). 73
Within these camps, mortality rates soared, and by 2005, as many as 1,000 people died
every week within them from AIDS, malaria, and continued LRA raids. 74
As Branch explains in his exposé of the harmful effects of aid in northern
Uganda, “agencies found it convenient to cooperate openly with the government’s
counterinsurgency to the point of enabling its policy of mass forced displacement and
internment, which itself resulted in the humanitarian crisis.” 75 Similarly, John Perkins
cites a hard-hitting critique of the aid programs during the LRA conflict to support his
71
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thesis that the maintenance of poverty in Africa ultimately benefits aid organizations.
This critique, written by an aid worker, claims that aid organizations “[prolong] the
conflict simply by being there. As long as the situation is considered an emergency,
donors will continue funding activities…[though] the situation is worse after decades of
Western involvement and billions of dollars of aid money.” 76
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in 2007 by the State
Department, was created to “deter and defeat transnational threats, prevent future
conflicts, support humanitarian and disaster relief, and protect U.S. security interests” in
Africa, which include countering terrorist threats, protecting oil reserves and other nonrenewable resources, and countering Chinese influence on the continent. 77 Abundant
resources, for which China, the United States, and other developed nations compete,
include timber, diamonds, copper, cobalt, gold, uranium, coltan, and oil. 78 Further
justification for military presence comes from data suggesting that between 1991 and
2007, the majority of terrorist attacks were committed by actors from failing states
including Algeria, Somalia, and Sudan; as of 2014, a quarter of jihadists have been
recruited from African nations. 79
AFRICOM’s mission statement, in a departure from other military oriented
organizations, is the “unprecedented embrace” of peace-building operations, civic
participation, inter-governmental partnership, development of democratic institutions,
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and the redress of human rights violations. 80 Among the traditionally non-military
responsibilities of AFRICOM in Uganda, a “key U.S. strategic partner,” are addressing
population growth, weak infrastructures, corruption, developing democratic institutions,
and protecting human rights. Troops are also specifically tasked with “weakening the
LRA and reducing its threat to central Africa” and encouraging inter-governmental
cooperation and synchronization of the governments of Uganda, South Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Central African Republic in their efforts
against Kony and his men. 81
Despite this relatively humanitarian approach, which Branch refers to as
“militarizing peace,” several critics worry that AFRICOM is merely a new form of
exploitation of African countries for the benefit of US interests, but with the capacity to
initiate violent action. 82 A.C. LeVan concludes that support for the presence of
AFRICOM troops is correlated to the reception of American financial aid, suggesting
that, with regard to US military involvement, “politics remain embedded within broader
economic relationships,” specifically aid dependence, rather than efficacy. 83 Similarly,
Kofi Nsia-Pepra argues that the militarization of financial and humanitarian aid has
“backfired due to the inherent contradiction of the use of realist means to achieve liberal
ends.” 84 In other words, the nature of military intervention, generally criticized as
imperialism aimed solely at controlling resources, is thought to violate the sovereignty of
other nations and undermine the welfare of the affected populations. 85
80
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In Branch’s evaluation of AFRICOM in pursuit of the LRA, he argues that
American activism falls prey to the same “political pathologies” of other forms of
intervention despite their humanitarian objectives, and even concludes that “the lack of
accountability to so-called beneficiaries” is “intensified” due to AFRICOM’s military
capabilities. 86 In summary, the fundamental criticisms of the presence of American
troops in Africa are that military intervention is the “antithesis of genuine solidarity,” and
has been enacted solely so that “self-righteous American youth can feel that they are
saving helpless victims,” when in reality they are protecting American interests through
military force and economic and political exploitation. 87
While the use of armed forces to achieve humanitarian ends seems
counterintuitive to some critics, numerous military personnel and analysts suggest that
the combination of military enforcement and combat capabilities with humanitarian aims
is the future of conflict prevention and infrastructure strengthening essential to
combatting terrorism and repressing insurgencies. The US military defines
counterinsurgency as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and
civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency,” which requires civilmilitary relations between intergovernmental organizations, multinational groups, nongovernmental organizations, foreign militaries, and especially host-nation civil
authorities. 88 Units within the US military pursuing these objectives are responsible for
administrating basic medical care, overseeing WFP shipments, providing supplies for
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vital public services, and improving relations with the host community. 89 Several
veterans with backgrounds in aid work as well as journalists embedded with US troops
have encouraged the development of “diplomatic and influencing efforts” on the part of
US armed forces, supporting the belief that in international conflict, “the real foes are
poverty, disorder and inchoate violence… igniting in dysfunctional failed nation-states
and anarchic No-Man’s Lands…” 90 As Eric Greitens, a Rhodes scholar, former aid
worker, and retired Navy Seal writes, “without courage, compassion falters, and without
compassion, courage has no direction;” this idealistic attitude encompasses modern
thought regarding the capacity of Western militaries to engage in preventative warfare via
infrastructure strengthening, civil development, and diplomacy. 91 Despite growing
support for these methods, mixed results in Iraq and Afghanistan and, as seen in Uganda,
suspicion of the underlying motives of the US government have also raised skepticism
and criticism regarding the combination of military force and humanitarian missions.
While the efficacy and motives behind direct US intervention can be debated, the
indirect effects on the affected civilian populations due to the intergovernmental
dynamics must also be considered. Specifically in Uganda, retaining President Museveni
as a regional ally in the ‘War on Terror’ has allowed numerous instances of government
oppression and military resource exploitation, human rights abuses, and violations of
other nations’ sovereignties to go unpunished by the US or its international supporters.
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Despite early praise for his efforts at combatting AIDS and reforming the political
and economic infrastructure of Uganda, Museveni’s record of improving transparency
and encouraging good governance has faltered since the LRA insurgency due to his
increasingly authoritarian regime based on corruption rather than democracy. According
to Fund for Peace’s 2013 Failed States Index, Uganda is ranked as the 22nd most failed
state in the world between Syria and North Korea. 92 In terms of government legitimacy it
is ranked in the bottom 40 worldwide, with a score of 8.1 out of 10, with 10 representing
the lowest level of legitimacy. 93 This ranking is the result of Museveni’s undemocratic
and unconstitutional efforts to retain power, including extending term limits in the
Ugandan constitution a year before the 2006 elections allowing him to run again. 94
Though northern Ugandans, especially the Acholi victimized by both the LRA and the
national military in the ongoing conflict, did not support Museveni, he carried the 2006
elections in a controversial win that is widely believed to have been “stolen.” 95 In
addition to his “growing dictatorial practices,” Museveni has been accused of cultivating
a “web of corrupt patronage networks” to retain the loyalty of the Uganda People’s
Defense Force (UPDF) and governmental officials. 96 The use of the UPDF as a de facto
personal army, corruption to maintain favor and power, and increasingly undemocratic
practices has ultimately “tainted” Museveni’s governance record and international
reputation, yet has not had any lasting impact on his alliance with the United States. 97
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In addition to serving as the “bedrock” of Museveni’s political power, the UPDF
has been accused of corruption and human rights abuses within Uganda during their
deployment in the north against the LRA. 98 As early as 1986, the NRM founded and led
by Museveni and their armed forces, now the UPDF, were accused of atrocities, and even
suspected of genocide against the Acholi. 99 Most prevalent among these accusations was
the complicity and occasional participation of the UPDF in Karamajong cattle raids,
launched from the failed region in northeastern Uganda, as far west as Gulu, situated
halfway across the country. 100 While completing missions in the North, especially in
Acholiland, national defense officers were caught in the infamous ‘ghost soldier scandal,’
pocketing the salaries of dead, missing, and deserted soldiers whom they failed to
report. 101 More recently, while combatting Kony’s insurgency, the Ugandan military has
been accused of atrocities “strikingly similar” to those prosecuted by the International
Criminal Court against the LRA, including conscripting child soldiers, forcibly displacing
civilians in the North, and committing crimes against humanity. 102 In response to these
allegations, the UPDF has instituted “internal measures” to investigate potential crimes
committed by their forces, though these reforms were not initiated until after the LRA
had fled the country. 103
Not only does the UPDF face allegations of abuses within Uganda, it has been
convicted of plundering Congolese resources and committing human rights abuses during
their deployment in the eastern edge of DRC. Among the resources found in this region
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are copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold, coltan (found in many electronics including mobile
phones), timber, tin, and uranium. 104 Between 1998 and 2003, UPDF troops occupied
eastern Congo and plundered millions of dollars of local resources. Perhaps the most
telling evidence is the national exportation of $60 million of gold, though Uganda’s
domestic production of gold yields only $24,817. 105 In addition to looting in a "flagrant
violation of Congolese sovereignty,” the UPDF has been accused of exacerbating the
existing conflict in northeastern Congo by contributing military support for rebel groups
and “acting like warlords in uniform… fueling more slaughter, rape, and robbery” in an
already conflicted region. 106 In 2010, a UN commission found evidence of both war
crimes and crimes against humanity during the deployment of Ugandan troops in
DRC. 107
Outside of the Congo, the ongoing conflict with the LRA was also proving to be
profitable to the government of Uganda. In the name of defense, the UPDF continued
expanding north into Acholiland, where the population was largely contained in
overcrowded IDP camps, and war profiteering was an increasingly prevalent problem. 108
In addition to conflict profiteering, the national government was enjoying economic,
political, and military support from the United States and its allies due to their efforts
against the War on Terror. At the same time, a series of negotiation attempts were being
orchestrated between the Ugandan government and the LRA, with help from the
governments of South Sudan and the United States, though a series of setbacks including
104
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Kony’s refusal to appear and the announcement of total war against the LRA in 1996 led
to the escalation of violence against civilians by Kony’s forces. 109 The failure of the
peace talks was aggravated by Museveni’s hardline approach and frustration with the
Sudanese government, which he blamed for breakdown of negotiations. Portraying Kony
as the “arch villain” of the violence enabled the allied governments of Uganda and the
US to overlook both Museveni’s own culpability in failing to bring an end to the conflict,
and American complicity in its continuation.110
Despite Museveni’s shortcomings and mounting evidence of governmental and
military abuses, including “election theft,” human rights abuses, violations of the
Congo’s sovereignty, and obstruction the negotiation process, the US continues to
support Uganda politically, militarily, and financially. As Branch concludes in his own
critique, Museveni and the government of Uganda have
managed to divert a significant portion of its budget to defense over donor
protests, invade and occupy eastern DRC with devastating consequences,
come to the brink of war with Rwanda, viciously shut down political
opposition, rig elections, amend the constitution so as to allow Museveni
to be president for life, engage in massive and systemic corruption, and
fail to make a serious effort to end the war in northern Uganda either
militarily or through negotiations. 111
However, strategic interests prevent the US government from punishing or even
acknowledging these significant abuses and international controversies.
VIII.

Underlying Political Objectives of US-Uganda Alliance and Regional Impact
In addition to the oversight of the abuses of Museveni’s regime, its failure to

adequately address the civil war, and the unintended consequences of American aid in
Acholiland, the violence of the LRA conflict and the subsequent US alliance with
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Uganda has impacted the region beyond Uganda’s borders both positively and negatively.
The US has manipulated geopolitical relations in efforts to secure access to lucrative oil
reserves and to stunt the growth of transnational terrorist organizations both before 9/11
and after the declaration of the ‘War on Terror.’ Furthermore, continued support for the
SPLA throughout the independence movement and participation in the negotiation
process of South Sudanese independence has cemented American influence in the
conflict, the portrayal of which, several scholars suggest, was manipulated to justify
American intervention.
As previously mentioned, the US strengthened their geopolitical relationship with
Uganda, among other reasons, to combat the spread of terrorist organizations, particularly
in Sudan and Somalia. Khartoum before 9/11 had been loosely allied with revolutionary
Iran and was accused of providing military aid and assistance to Egyptian terrorist
groups. 112 An alliance was also established between prominent Sudanese official Hassan
al-Turabi and Osama Bin Laden that allowed Bin Laden freedom of movement in Sudan
in exchange for funding for al-Turabi’s political party, the National Islamic Front,
securing Sudan’s placement on the US State Department’s list of states sponsoring
terror. 113 Following the 1998 attacks by Islamic terrorists on the American embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya and growing concerns about the Islamic terror “triangle” between
the failing, predominantly Muslim states of Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen, the US
strengthened their alliance with Uganda in an effort to prevent Islamic extremist violence
in the region. 114

112

Shay, Shaul. The Red Sea Terror Triangle: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005., 40, 27
113
Ibid., 35, 46; United States Department of State
114
Shay, 51, 197

Norris 32
After the September 11th attacks, US influence in the region and a desire to avoid
an Afghanistan-style invasion encouraged the Sudanese government to distance itself
from al-Qaeda. 115 Eventually supporting the US in the global ‘War on Terror,’ Sudan
allowed for the arrest of 30 Afghans on Sudanese soil, at which point the US rescinded
previously imposed sanctions. 116 As such, Khartoum joined Uganda in a regional alliance
with the US against the spread of Islamic extremism and trans-national terrorism.
However despite Sudan’s newfound support for the US, some critics believe that the
outbreak of violence in Darfur was framed by the “managers of the ‘War on Terror,’”
including America, as a genocidal conflict perpetrated by the Sudanese government,
though UN and ICC reports that found no evidence of intent to commit genocide. 117 It
has also been suggested that, in addition to framing al-Bashir’s administration in an
antagonistic light as a strategy in the ‘War on Terror,’ mineral wealth and oil deposits
motivated increased US presence in Darfur. 118
Uganda’s proximity to Sudan, a nation with an overwhelming Sunni population,
and Museveni’s longstanding rivalry with President al-Bashir and subsequent proxy war
made it a strategic ally in American efforts to curb Islamic extremism in the region. 119
After 9/11, this geopolitical alliance was further strengthened by Uganda’s participation
in both African Union (AU) and UN efforts against al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabab in
Somalia. Providing 4500 out of 8000 UN troops, and 3400 out of 6000 AU troops, the
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UPDF comprises a significant portion of forces serving in Somalia. 120 In addition to
benefitting from significant aid contributions and development programs provided by the
US government, Uganda profits from its participation in anti-al-Shabab missions through
a quid pro quo system in which the US supports the UPDF’s pursuit of the LRA in
exchange for continued membership in the UN and AU forces. 121
In addition to combatting terrorism, US interests in oil found in the region have
also encouraged improved relations with Uganda, South Sudan, and Sudan. As noted by
some scholars, there is a correlation between American foreign involvement in
conflicted, developing nations and resource acquisition. Though the conflicts in the
Angola, the Congo, and for that matter, Uganda, endured years without significant
international attention, the outbreak of violence in Darfur garnered an immediate global
outcry, perhaps because the 8% of oil revenue obtained by America from Angola was
uninterrupted by the violence and protected by Cuban forces from damage. 122 In contrast,
in Darfur there was a “global publicity boom [regarding] the carnage in Darfur,” despite
the lack of evidence of genocidal government policies, possibly due to the manipulation
of Sudan’s image in the ‘War on Terror,’ or because of the extensive oil wealth potential
of Sudan and South Sudan, for which the US desired an excuse for regional
intervention. 123
Continuing their involvement with the proxy war between Uganda and Sudan, the
US became an actor in the South Sudanese independence movement and the negotiations
in Juba in 2011. In 2002, an official alliance forged between al-Bashir and Museveni
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resulted in Operation IRON FIST, in which the anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 UPDF
troops were authorized to enter southern Sudan in search of the LRA and Joseph Kony.
However, their efforts were unsuccessful and resulted only in increased reprisals by the
LRA against Sudanese civilians. 124 In an effort to prevent a repetition of the 2002
mission, the US provided advisors and intelligence analysts to support Operation
LIGHTNING THUNDER, a 2008 invasion into the Congo also in pursuit of Kony and
his followers. 125 Though moderately more successful, only 150 LRA members were
killed, 5 commanders captured, and 300 abductees freed. 126 Yet, despite this cooperative
effort against the LRA between America, Sudan, and Uganda, the US still consistently
accused the Sudanese government of genocide in Darfur while the SPLA was given
“special attention” as the US government “sought to transform the guerilla force into a
more professional, modern army” during the independence movement. 127
As a result, when negotiations commenced between Khartoum and Juba, the US
became a key participant. 128 The long-standing alliance between America and the South
Sudanese rebels, from its inception as part of the Ugandan-Sudanese proxy war to
participation in anti-LRA efforts with the SPLA, reflects the consistency of the USUgandan alliance as a regional ally in the ‘War on Terror,’ but may also be indicative of
American interests in South Sudanese oil, which made up 98% of the country’s revenue
as of 2011. 129
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IX.

Conclusion
Since the outbreak of violence between the Lord's Resistance Army and the

government of Uganda, international efforts to provide aid and ameliorate the conflict
have been implemented with varying degrees of success. American governmental efforts
through the US military, USAID, and diplomatic efforts have yielded progress, as have
the projects instituted by NGOs such as Invisible Children. However the unintended
consequences have in many cases undermined these advancements. The most notable
consequence of America’s alliance with Uganda, which has yielded a relatively stable
regional partner in the ‘War on Terror,’ is the lack of accountability facing President
Museveni in response to his increasingly dictatorial regime, invasion and plunder of the
Congo, and accusations of crimes against humanity made against the Ugandan military.
US focus on the maintenance of relations with Uganda in an effort to combat terrorism
has allowed Museveni to go unpunished, has prevented the critical examination of the
efficacy of projects implemented by Invisible Children and USAID, justified military
presence in the region, and distracted international audiences from the role of Western
nations in the destabilization of East Africa, rather than improving the situations of the
victims of the LRA conflict.
While further research should be conducted on the local impacts of USAID
programs, AFRICOM’s operations collecting intelligence on the LRA and reintegrating
child-soldiers, and efforts by the US governments and American NGOs to improve
governance and infrastructure in Northern Uganda, the overarching effects of US
presence in Northern Uganda and regional geopolitics must also be considered in future
policy in the East African Community. However, the failure of current US policies to
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address or even acknowledge the underlying internal divisions, governmental abuses, and
regional influences that serve as the fundamental causes of the LRA conflict, has
inhibited recovery efforts in the region and diverted resources into short-term relief aid
rather than long-term solutions. Furthermore, the focus on geopolitical maneuvering of
the governments of Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda as part of the ‘War on Terror’ or as
an effort to secure oil, has given Museveni protection against prosecution for invading the
Congo and more recently South Sudan, as well as engaging in subversive proxy wars that
have impacted both Sudan and Rwanda. The current administration, dominated by
Museveni and the NRM, has consistently committed human rights abuses and
undermined national governance, while failing to make a serious effort to protect the
people of Acholiland or end the violence with the LRA, instead exacerbating it with
inflammatory ultimatums.
The human impact of this trans-national violence among rebel groups as a result
of these proxy wars, operations against the LRA, and the consequences of geopolitical
maneuvering, poor governance, poverty, and regional instability is extensive. The Acholi
people’s long-term suffering as a result of both LRA and UPDF violence, poverty
induced by IDP camps, infrastructural destruction, regional development disparities, and
evolving dependency on foreign aid has been sufficiently devastating to the region.
However, civilian populations in the Congo, South Sudan, and more recently Central
African Republic have also been afflicted by LRA atrocities and retaliatory military
operations. Regional instability, including the recent coup and outbreak of violence in
South Sudan, the concentration of the most failed states in the world, and human
insecurity caused by mass displacement, poverty, and infrastructural destruction, is only
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exacerbated by geopolitical manipulation by the governments of Uganda and the US. As
part of America’s efforts to procure oil in a resource-rich region and combat terrorism,
specifically against al-Shabab and al-Qaeda in East Africa, the unintended effects of
American aid and the allowance of governmental and human rights abuses by the
Museveni administration have ultimately caused more harm than good. Exacerbation of
trans-national conflict, rebel violence, and the oversight of governmental abuses of
strategic US allies have caused immeasurable damage to both the affected civilian
populations and the overall stability of the region, outweighing the benefits brought by
aid programs.
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